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From SO2 to Greenhouse Gases: Trends and Events Shaping Future Emissions 
Trading Programs in the United States 
Joseph Kruger 
Abstract 
Cap-and-trade programs have become widely accepted for the control of conventional air 
pollution in the United States. However, there is still no political consensus to use these programs 
to address greenhouse gases. Meanwhile, in the wake of the success of the U.S. SO2 and NOx 
trading programs, private companies, state governments, and the European Union are developing 
new trading programs or other initiatives that may set precedents for a future national U.S. 
greenhouse gas trading scheme. This paper summarizes the literature on the “lessons learned” 
from the SO2 trading program for greenhouse gas trading, including lessons about the potential 
differences in design that may be necessary because of the different sources, science, mitigation 
options, and economics inherent in greenhouse gases. The paper discusses how the programs and 
initiatives mentioned above have been shaped by lessons from past trading programs and whether 
they are making changes to the SO2 model to address greenhouse gases. Finally, the paper 
concludes with an assessment of the implications of these initiatives for a future U.S. national 
greenhouse gas trading program. 
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 From SO2 to Greenhouse Gases: Trends and Events Shaping Future 
Emissions Trading Programs in the United States 
Joseph Kruger∗
1 Introduction 
The success of the U.S. SO2 trading program has led to worldwide interest in emissions 
trading. The program has become a model for policymakers in the United States and in other 
countries that are considering cap-and-trade programs to reduce emissions. Once a theoretical 
option discussed only by economists, emissions trading is now considered a mainstream policy 
instrument in the United States with bipartisan political support. Internationally, emissions 
trading is no longer considered a “crazy American idea.” It is now a fundamental component of 
the international framework to address climate change. Even developing countries from Chile to 
China are beginning to consider emissions trading programs to control conventional pollutants 
(U.S. EPA 2004a). 
Many articles and studies have examined the lessons learned from the SO2 trading 
program for greenhouse gas (GHG) trading. At the same time, fundamental differences between 
the climate change issue and conventional air pollution problems have led a number of authors to 
argue that certain features of the SO2 program should be modified to address climate change. 
Analysis of both the similarities and differences between SO2 and greenhouse gases has also 
informed U.S. legislative and policy proposals.  
While debate on the optimal design of greenhouse gas trading programs continues, there 
is still no consensus at the federal policymaking level on the need for a mandatory program. 
However, the successful experience with SO2 trading has inspired other domestic and 
international initiatives. These initiatives are incorporating lessons from SO2 trading as they 
anticipate and try to shape the future of greenhouse gas trading. For example, private companies 
are adopting voluntary targets and other initiatives, some of which are designed to influence 
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future mandatory approaches. State governments in nine New England and Mid-Atlantic states 
are developing a regional greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program, which is designed to encourage 
certain elements of a national program. States are also developing emissions registries, which 
may have implications for the design of future national trading programs. Finally, the European 
Union has recently begun operation of the world’s largest emissions trading program. As a “first 
mover” on emissions trading, the EU program could set precedents and develop new features 
that may have an impact on the ultimate design of both the international trading regime and any 
potential U.S. domestic program. 
In this paper I will discuss the path from SO2 to greenhouse gas trading from both a 
design and a political economy perspective. First, I will briefly summarize the literature on the 
“lessons learned” from the SO2 trading program for greenhouse gas trading. This will include 
discussion of potential differences in design that may be necessary because of the different 
sources, science, mitigation options, and economics of the climate change issue. Next, I will 
discuss how the three initiatives mentioned above have been shaped by lessons from past trading 
programs and are making changes to the SO2 model to address greenhouse gases. Finally, I will 
conclude with an assessment of the most likely impacts from these initiatives on a future U.S. 
federal greenhouse gas trading program.  
2 SO2 Trading: Lessons Learned 
The SO2 trading program has been widely studied, and there is an extensive literature 
examining various aspects of the program.1 A subset of this literature has looked specifically at 
lessons that would apply to greenhouse gas trading.2 In general, most authors view the SO2 
program as a successful experiment, proving that emissions trading can be an effective and 
efficient policy instrument. Many authors have noted that emissions trading is particularly well 
suited for greenhouse gases because it is uniformly mixed and does not require limitations on 
trading to limit “hot spots.”  
                                                 
1 For economic assessments of the SO2 program see Ellerman et al. 2000, Carlson et al. 2000, and Burtraw and 
Palmer 2004. For an independent assessment of the benefits of the program, see Burtraw et al. 1999. U.S. EPA 
2004b summarizes the environmental impacts of the program. 
2 See, for example, Stavins 1998, ELI 1997, Tietenberg 2003, and Ellerman 2005, and Burtraw et al. 2005. 
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Analysis of the SO2 program also sheds light on specific design elements that would be 
desirable to apply to a future greenhouse gas trading program. For example, experience with the 
SO2 trading program has shown significant benefits from the temporal flexibility provided by 
banking provisions (Burtraw and Palmer 2004, Stavins 2003, Ellerman et al. 2000).3 Second, 
analysts have noted that allowance distribution, particularly the allocation of allowances at no 
cost to affected facilities, has been critical in gaining political acceptance for the emissions 
trading concept (Stavins 1998, Ellerman 2005). Third, authors have emphasized the importance 
of strong monitoring and enforcement provisions, including reasonably accurate emissions 
measurement, automatic excess emissions penalties that are not subject to appeal or waivers 
(Ellerman 2003, Swift 2001), and public access to emissions and trading data through the use of 
information technology and the Internet (Tietenberg 2003, Kruger et al. 2000). Finally, observers 
have lauded the hands-off design of the cap-and-trade model, in which regulators track emission 
results but don’t interfere in company decisions on emissions reduction options or conduct case-
by-case reviews of trades (Ellerman 2005). 
While there is general agreement that the SO2 program “proves the concept” of emissions 
trading for a greenhouse gas program, there is also considerable discussion in the literature about 
modifications to the basic SO2 model that would be needed for a greenhouse gas program. 
Although a full discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper, these 
differences boil down into five types. First, analysts have noted that the ideal program for 
greenhouse gas trading would be economy-wide, rather than in specific sectors (e.g., electric 
power). This is because of the prevalence of CO2 in virtually every economic sector and the 
efficiencies that arise by equalizing marginal costs across the entire economy. To facilitate an 
economy-wide system, these analysts have argued that CO2 emissions should be regulated 
“upstream” (i.e., by producers or processors of fuel) rather than “downstream” (i.e., direct 
emitters such as power plants and industrial facilities) to capture the largest percentage of 
emissions and to encompass the fewest number of sources (Keeler 2002, Morgenstern 2005 
forthcoming). 4  
                                                 
3 In contrast, the lack of an adequate banking provision in the RECLAIM trading program in Southern California 
may have been at least partially responsible for extreme price volatility following high electricity demand in 2000. 
See Ellerman et al. 2003. 
4 A hybrid system with both upstream and downstream elements is also possible (ELI 1997, Hargrave 2000). See 
Baron and Bygrave 2002 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different points of obligation for 
holding allowances. 
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Second, a trading system should consider multiple greenhouse gases to capture the widest 
array of cost-effective sources.5 For example, Reilly et al. (2003) find that inclusion of all six 
greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto agreements could provide increased emissions 
reduction at a lower cost.6 Inclusion of multiple gases in Kyoto and other trading regimes is 
possible because of a system of global warming potential (GWP) factors, which have been 
adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These GWP factors serve as 
an “exchange rate” to set equivalencies for the six gases regulated under the Kyoto agreement.  
Third, because of the magnitude of the emission allowance assets involved, a greenhouse 
gas trading program should consider auctioning, rather than free distribution of allowances. For 
example, Cramton and Kerr (2002) describe a number of equity benefits from the auctioning of 
allowances, including providing a source of revenue that could potentially address inequities 
brought about by a carbon policy, creation of an equal opportunity for new entrants in the 
allowance market, and avoiding the potential for “windfall profits” that might accrue to 
emissions sources if allowances are allocated at no charge.7 Goulder et al. (1999) and Dinan and 
Rogers (2002) found that recycling revenues from auctioned allowances could have economy-
wide efficiency benefits if they are used to reduce certain types of taxes.  
Fourth, some analysts have advocated additional mechanisms to limit price risks from a 
greenhouse gas trading system.8 For example, Pizer (2002) proposes a “safety valve” mechanism 
that would mitigate price risks by allowing sources to purchase additional allowances at a set 
price if allowance prices rise to that level. Kolstad (2005 forthcoming) finds that intensity 
targets, i.e., targets that index emissions to GDP or production, can reduce uncertainties 
associated with the cost of emission reduction under uncertain economic growth levels. 
Advocates of these types of mechanisms argue that CO2 prices may be more unpredictable than 
                                                 
5 Stavins and Richards (2005) find that biologic carbon sequestration is also a cost-effective strategy that could be 
part of a climate mitigation regime.  
6 In cases where it may be difficult to measure total mass from these sources but relatively easy to measure emission 
reductions (e.g., reductions of methane from a landfill) these sources might be captured with project-level offset 
provisions rather than through inclusion in the cap-and-trade program (U.S. EPA 2003). 
7 Bovenberg and Goulder 2001, and Burtraw et al. 2002 find that allocating only a small portion of allowances at no 
cost can compensate industry for losses due to a carbon policy. 
8 Allowance banking can also serve this function by creating a cushion that will prevent price spikes and hedge 
uncertainty in allowance prices (Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) also note that some 
environmental groups have opposed a safety valve because it creates less certainty about the quantity that will be 
emitted.  
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SO2 prices because there are relatively few mitigation options for CO2, and there are currently no 
cost-effective post-combustion controls.9 Moreover, CO2 is a “stock pollutant,” which 
accumulates in the atmosphere over an extended period. There is therefore less concern over 
short-term increase of CO2 as long as the overall trajectory of CO2 emissions is downward over 
an extended period. 
Finally, many analysts have advocated international trading of greenhouse gas 
allowances, given that the atmosphere is indifferent to the location of emission reductions. 
International trading provides opportunities to incorporate reductions from developing countries 
like China and India, where analysis shows some of the lowest cost emission reduction 
opportunities (Ellerman and Decaux 1998). This concept is fundamental to the Kyoto Protocol, 
which provides for international trading among parties and for the development of project-level 
offsets in developing countries (Tietenberg et al. 1999). 
2.1 Legislative and Policy Proposals for Greenhouse Gas Trading 
Many of the features discussed above have been incorporated into legislative and policy 
proposals for greenhouse gas trading programs. For example, the McCain-Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship Act (S. 139) would cover much of the economy and would address the 
transportation sector “upstream” by requiring oil refiners to hold allowances. The McCain- 
Lieberman bill allows for emissions offsets (including non-CO2 and biologic sequestration 
projects) and contains provisions for international trading, as does a bill introduced by Senator 
Carper (S. 843) that addresses CO2 and other emissions in the electric power sector. Finally, an 
economy-wide, upstream proposal by the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) 
includes an intensity-based target and a price cap to limit price uncertainties (NCEP 2004).10
While debate continues on these policy proposals, there is still no consensus in Congress 
on the need for a mandatory program, and few believe that new legislation will be adopted 
quickly.11 Meanwhile, the Bush administration has rejected a mandatory approach to climate 
                                                 
9 In the longer term, there may be cost-effective technologies to remove and sequester CO2 from combustion. See 
Newell and Anderson 2004. 
10 Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico has reportedly developed draft legislation based on the NCEP proposal 
(Eilperin, 2005). 
11 Although the Senate has adopted a non-binding resolution calling for a mandatory market-based program to 
address greenhouse gases (Blum, 2005), no such resolution has been adopted by the House of Representatives. 
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change. Instead, the administration has emphasized the long-term development of “climate-
friendly” technology and the improvement of energy intensity through the implementation of a 
suite of voluntary measures.12  
Thus, the most direct road to a national program, i.e., new national legislation, appears to 
be blocked for now. Instead, a variety of other initiatives, all of which were influenced by past 
U.S. trading programs, are establishing “facts on the ground” that may set precedents for a future 
U.S. program. The following sections will explore these initiatives. 
3 Voluntary Corporate Initiatives 
Some companies have implemented strategies to prepare for what they believe is an 
inevitable carbon constraint. In part, these strategies are designed to mitigate the risks of future 
carbon legislation. However, some companies have also staked out positions that they hope will 
influence potential future mandatory programs. This section will:  
  Summarize the literature on why companies may voluntarily take environmental 
actions; 
  Review company efforts on climate change; and  
  Discuss the implications of voluntary corporate actions on the design of a future 
greenhouse gas trading program.  
3.1 Why Do Companies Take Voluntary Action? 
There are a variety of reasons that corporations adopt voluntary environmental actions to 
address greenhouse gas emissions or other environmental issues. Some companies have 
attributed these actions to sustainable development goals or environmental stewardship policies 
(Margolick and Russell 2001). However, it is often difficult to separate these goals from 
economic motives (Kolk and Pinske 2004).  
Less controversial is the notion that companies adopt voluntary initiatives to create 
financial value in one form or another. Lyon and Maxwell (2004) argue for a political economy 
                                                 
12 For a more detailed description of the Bush administration climate change plan, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html. 
6 Resources for the Future  Kruger 
framework for understanding corporate voluntary environmental action. In particular, they note 
that corporations may act in a desire to pre-empt or influence future regulation.13 For example, 
adopting environmental technologies or other strategies ahead of regulatory mandates can signal 
to regulators that these alternatives are practical or relatively cost effective (Lyon and Maxwell 
2004). Reinhardt (1999) describes how this strategy was pursued in the chlorofluorocarbon 
(CFC) manufacturing industry before the adoption of the Montreal Protocol. In other cases, trade 
associations have sponsored codes of management practices, which are partly intended to 
forestall the imposition of government mandates. For example, Nash and Ehrenfeld (1996) 
describe the Responsible Care Program, a voluntary code of management practices set up by the 
U.S. chemical industry that was designed as a voluntary effort to forestall the imposition of 
mandatory regulations on chemical production.  
3.2 Voluntary Corporate Targets 
A recent study found that as many as many as 60 U.S. corporations have adopted 
corporate greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (Hoffman 2005). Some of these companies 
have participated in one of several partnership programs run by government agencies or non-
governmental organizations (see Table 1). Under many of these programs, companies develop a 
corporate greenhouse gas inventory and adopt an emission target.14 Some of the partnership 
programs allow additional flexibility in meeting a target through the use of emissions trading or 
the purchase of greenhouse gas offsets.  
Corporate voluntary targets and participation in initiatives run by NGOs or government 
may have several impacts on future trading programs. First, companies may gain expertise that 
may be useful in assessing the impact of various regulatory policies on their companies. 
Hoffman (2005) finds that some companies have adopted internal emissions trading schemes or 
                                                 
13 There are also non-political motivations for voluntary corporate actions. Although a full discussion of these 
motivations is beyond the scope of this paper, drivers of voluntary action described in the literature include: (a) the 
desire to limit future regulatory risk (Margolick and Russell 2001); (b) the desire to reduce costs through practices 
that also have environmental benefits (Esty and Porter 1998); (c) desire to differentiate a company or its products on 
an environmental basis (Reinhardt 1998); and (d) the desire to enhance employee morale and motivation (Reinhardt 
2000).  
14 These targets take different forms. Companies such as U.S. electric power generators American Electric Power 
and Energy have adopted absolute targets based on mass emissions corresponding to a base year (King et al. 2004). 
Other companies, such as Rio Tinto and IBM, have adopted intensity targets, under which they commit to surpass a 
benchmark of emissions or energy use per unit of production or sales (Margolick and Russell 2001). 
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greenhouse gas measurement programs to gain expertise that will help them influence future 
national or international policies. Both British Petroleum (Akhurst et al. 2003) and Shell 
(Margolick and Russell 2001) have cited this experience as helping them gain influence in the 
design of the UK and EU trading systems.  
Second, some aspects of voluntary corporate targets have implications for how a 
company will be affected by a future greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program. For example, fast-
growing companies may be favored by rate-based or intensity targets as opposed to absolute 
targets based on mass emissions. This type of target may also favor companies with low carbon 
intensities. The type of corporate obligation chosen could also be designed to establish a 
precedent for a specific allocation methodology, such as a methodology based on historic 
emissions, heat input, or production output. Similarly, the “baseline protection” offered by 
registries may imply that a future allowance distribution will be done based on historic emissions 
or an output based methodology rather than through an auction.  
Finally, to the extent that corporate targets or baselines are measured from specific years, 
companies become invested in allocation methodologies or future targets that include these 
years. For example, in describing its voluntary commitment of a 5% reduction below 2000 
levels, the electric power company Cinergy notes: 
“Besides the obvious commodity price risk implicit in our target, we also are 
bearing some risk that our efforts will not be counted within a future regulatory 
regime. If the baseline is established far in the future, man years beyond the year 
2000, with a specific provision to disallow early reductions, we would find that 
we had implemented our program too early. We believe this is unlikely, though it 
remains a risk.” (Cinergy 2004)15
3.2.1 Chicago Climate Exchange 
The corporate initiative most directly influenced by the SO2 trading experience and most 
open about influencing a future climate regime is the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). For 
more information on CCX and other programs see Table 1. Richard Sandor, the president of the 
CCX, has invoked the SO2 experience as a model “for the design of key elements” of the 
program (Sandor 2002). One of the key program goals of CCX is to give companies experience 
                                                 
15 Cinergy has recently announced a plan to merge with Duke Energy, which declared its support for a carbon tax in 
April 2005 (Borska 2005).  
8 Resources for the Future  Kruger 
with the mechanics and methodologies that will be necessary for the greenhouse gas market. 
Sandor (2002) also emphasizes the goal of influencing future legislation, noting that “a variety of 
legislative proposals have provided further indication that participation in CCX will help position 
participants to intelligently influence and benefit from possible future regulations.” Similarly, an 
official from American Electric Power, a participant in CCX, has noted that one of the 
motivations for participation in the voluntary program is the company’s interest in the 
development and use of greenhouse gas offsets or “off-system” reductions (Braine 2004). A 
report by independent directors of AEP notes that the company’s participation in CCX and other 
voluntary efforts have given it important experience in the design of potential future regulatory 
programs. The report finds that 
  “the company is particularly well positioned to build on this experience to 
advocate effectively in policy and regulatory forums for the most efficient 
program designs, not only for the environmental benefits, but also for the benefits 
to its customers over the long-term.” (AEP 2004) 
4 State Initiatives 
Over the past few years, there has been an explosion in state programs that address 
emissions from greenhouse gases (Rabe 2004, McKinstry 2004). These programs run the gamut 
from renewable energy portfolio standards in more than a dozen states to a proposed CO2 
emissions standard for automobiles in California. However, one of the most widespread 
categories of state activities are programs to measure, report, register, and, in some cases, trade 
greenhouse gas emissions. These programs raise questions about whether they will build 
intuitions and set precedents that are helpful or harmful to future national efforts. This section 
will examine the motivations behind these state programs and explore the challenges and 
opportunities they pose.  
4.1 Why Do States Take Voluntary Action? 
There is extensive literature debating the appropriate level of government to address 
environmental problems. Although a full discussion of these issues—usually referred to as 
Environmental Federalism—is beyond the scope of this paper, much of the debate centers on 
weighing consistency and competitiveness issues that might arise from different environmental 
standards in different jurisdictions against the benefits of more localized decision making on 
environmental issues (Oates 2001, Revesz 2001). Authors have also highlighted the influence 
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that state governments in the United States have had on national policy by experimenting with 
innovative initiatives (Oates 2001, McKinstry 2004, Vogel et al. 2005). 
Additional issues arise for state climate change policies because of the global nature of 
the problem. First, although states or regional governments may adopt emission reduction 
programs to address “their share” of the global problem, their efforts may be futile if other states 
or national governments avoid emission reductions. Similarly, the public within these states may 
be concerned that non-participating states are “free riders” who benefit from the actions of the 
participating areas without paying the costs (Kousky and Schneider 2003). Second, state actions 
raise the potential problem of “leakage” if mandatory requirements in one jurisdiction cause a 
shift in economic activity and emissions to another jurisdiction without mandatory requirements 
(Keeler 2004, Kruger and Pizer 2005). For example, limits on power plants emissions in one 
state or region may simply shift power generation to other regions of the country. Finally, Keeler 
(2004) notes that solutions developed at the state or local level may not create the institutions 
necessary for a robust national trading program. 
Nevertheless, states have cited a number of reasons for developing greenhouse gas 
programs. Many of these reasons are relevant to the registry or emissions trading initiatives that 
have proliferated. First, some states have adopted programs to address public or other 
stakeholder concerns about the impacts of climate change (Rabe 2004). Second, states have 
expressed a desire to influence national policy or regulations in ways that benefit their companies 
or other stakeholders. For example, Rabe (2004) argues that some U.S. states enacted greenhouse 
gas policies to facilitate recognition of emission reductions by companies in the event of future 
national regulations. Finally, some states have developed these programs to spur innovative 
technologies, encourage economic development benefits, or create environmental co-benefits 
(Peterson 2004). 
4.2 State Greenhouse Gas Trading Programs 
4.2.1 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
  One of the most significant state climate programs is an effort by nine states in the 
northeastern and Mid-Atlantic United States that have joined together to develop a regional cap-
and-trade program. This program, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
was launched in April 2003 when New York Governor George Pataki sent a letter proposing a 
regional emissions trading program to fellow governors. Initially, the program will address 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the electric power sector. However, the program may be 
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expanded to include additional sectors and greenhouse gases (GHGs). Advocates of the RGGI 
approach argue that the program could serve as a model for a future national cap-and-trade 
program for GHGs. 
  Organizers of RGGI have noted that the program will build upon past models of successful 
trading programs.16 Although this includes the SO2 program, RGGI is perhaps more similar to 
the OTC NOx budget program, which was itself highly influenced by the national SO2 trading 
program (Kruger and Pizer 2004, WRI 2005). Both the OTC and RGGI programs depend upon 
an innovative collaboration between states that voluntarily adopt model rules that allow the states 
to have the compatible features necessary for an emissions trading program. Although many of 
the details of RGGI are still in flux, the fundamentals will likely be very similar to past trading 
programs in the electric power sector. However, the RGGI program may experiment with some 
additional features that may be useful for a future greenhouse gas emissions trading program. 
Some of these features are discussed below. 
4.2.1.1 Emissions Allowance Distribution 
The distribution of allowances is one of the most contentious issues faced by 
policymakers when they design a cap-and-trade program. Allowances are a valuable asset, and 
the distribution of this asset has significant implications. Even with a modest target, the value of 
allowances in a national greenhouse gas trading program could be an order of magnitude (or 
more) larger than the value of allowances in the SO2 trading program. Thus, allowance 
distribution for a national program will raise significant equity issues. RGGI could offer the 
opportunity to try out features at the state or regional level, such as auctioning portions of the 
annual allocations or allocating some allowances directly to groups that are disproportionately 
affected by the costs of a cap-and-trade program. These types of approaches could be 
components of a future national program.  
4.2.1.2 Development of an Effective Offset Program 
 Greenhouse gas offsets could be a particularly cost-effective way to reduce the costs of a 
mandatory greenhouse gas program. Unfortunately, there are no effective models for offset 
programs to draw upon. Although project-based emissions offset programs for conventional 
                                                 
16 RGGI organizers have made building on past successful trading programs one of their “guiding principles.” See 
http://www.rggi.org/goals.htm.  
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pollutants have been around for many years, many of these programs have had limited 
effectiveness because of high transaction costs and uncertain environmental integrity (Swift 
2002). More recently, the process set up to implement the Clean Development Mechanism, the 
Kyoto Protocols project-level offset provision, has been costly and cumbersome (Jepma 2005). If 
states could advance an environmentally credible model with low transaction costs, it would be a 
significant contribution to a future national program. To this end, there have been discussions by 
the RGGI staff working group and their stakeholders about developing performance standards 
and other objective criteria that would provide clear signals to investors about the types of 
projects that would be acceptable (Sherry 2004). 
4.2.1.3 International Linkages 
 The launch of RGGI has sparked great interest in Europe, where, as will be discussed 
later, an even larger experiment with greenhouse gas trading began on January 1, 2005. There 
have been informal contacts between state officials and officials of the European Commission 
and European member states to share information on how the new European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) is developing. Contacts between the EU and states may provide 
opportunities to explore a number of “linking issues” that will be useful for any future GHG 
program (Fontaine 2005). RGGI states are also considering whether to accept EU ETS 
allowances and Clean Development Mechanism credits (Sherry 2005).  
4.2.2 West Coast Trading Initiatives 
  Three western states—California, Washington, and Oregon—have launched an initiative to 
develop a coordinated greenhouse gas reporting system (Rabe 2004, Pew Center 2004). These 
states have also indicated that they may consider a trading system. A staff report released in 
November 2004 recommended that the governors of the three states consider a regional market-
based carbon allowance program (WCGGI 2004).  
  West Coast states may develop a different model for a cap-and-trade program than has 
been developed by RGGI. Concerns about addressing imports of power from outside the state 
have led some stakeholders to advocate design approaches that focus on the distribution of 
electric power rather than generation. For example, an advisory group to the governor of Oregon 
has recommended a tradable carbon content standard for power consumed in the state, which 
would take power imports into account. (Governors Advisory Group 2004). California is 
considering a proposal to allocate allowances to load-serving entities, which would be required 
to hold allowances to cover the emissions of the electric power they distribute (CCAP 2005). 
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4.2.3 Registries as a Building Block for Trading? 
More than ten states have adopted or are in the process of adopting voluntary registries 
for greenhouse gas emissions (PPI 2003).17 Registries are electronic databases that track 
emission reductions by companies or other organizations. Under some of these programs, 
companies report their corporate-wide emissions and establish a baseline against which future 
corporate emission reductions can be counted. In other registry programs, companies may simply 
report specific emission reduction actions without reporting their overall corporate-wide 
emissions. Voluntary registries have a number of benefits, including helping corporations 
understand the scope of their emissions and possible mitigation measures that they might take. 
Registries may also raise awareness of the climate change issue and highlight the actions of 
companies that are leaders in reducing their emissions.  
Some analysts have touted voluntary registries as an important building block for a future 
mandatory emissions trading program (PPI 2003). However, several aspects of voluntary 
registries may complicate the development of a future emissions trading program. First, there is 
an inherent contradiction in voluntary registries because these programs must balance the desire 
to encourage participation with the costs associated with a rigorous emissions reporting program. 
If measurement and reporting requirements are too rigorous and costly, there will be few 
participants. Conversely, if program reporting restrictions are too lenient, the resulting data may 
not be an appropriate foundation for a future mandatory program. Second, most voluntary 
registries require reporting at the company-wide level rather than the facility level. While this is 
appropriate for a voluntary program that tracks a corporate emissions goal, it is less useful for a 
sector-wide or economy-wide mandatory trading program, where it is important to carefully 
track emissions at the facility level. Third, the promise of “credit” for early reductions, while 
potentially desirable for encouraging early action and building support for an eventual mandatory 
program, also raises a variety of complicated issues. These types of programs raise questions 
about whether they are awarding credits to actions that would have happened anyway as a result 
of business-as-usual activities (Parry and Toman 2002). Moreover, as discussed earlier, “baseline 
protection” programs may imply certain methodologies for future distribution of allowances 
under a mandatory program.  
                                                 
17 There is also a national registry set up under section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act. See 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/frntvrgg.html. 
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5 The European Union Emissions Trading System 
Undoubtedly, the most important development in emissions trading since the landmark 
SO2 trading program has been the launch of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS) on January 1, 2005. EU officials and others have noted the influence of the SO2 program 
on the EU ETS (Dimas 2005, Delbeke 2003, Zapfel and Vainio 2002, Christiansen and 
Wettestad 2003). Nevertheless, the EU ETS dwarfs existing U.S. trading programs in size and 
complexity (see Table 2), and the EU views its trading program as “shaping the future debate” 
over the use of emissions trading for climate policy (EC 2004a). The EU program encompasses a 
variety of new features and will experiment with a more decentralized approach to linking 
programs in the different EU Member States. It is also the flagship program in Europe’s efforts 
to meet requirements of the Kyoto protocol. As such, it has been both driven forward by the 
Kyoto mandate as well as burdened by some of the less desirable features of this international 
agreement. Potentially influential features of the EU ETS are discussed below. 
5.1 Participation by New Sectors 
The EU program incorporates a broader variety of industrial sectors than previous trading 
programs. For example, the program includes cement, lime, ceramics, and glass facilities, 
sources in the pulp and paper sector, and sources in the metal ore and iron and steel industry. 
Although U.S. NOx programs have included some industrial sources, the scope and number of 
sources outside of the electric power sectors in the EU ETS are far greater. Inclusion of these 
sources has required the development of new emissions measurement protocols and may foster 
the development of additional options to reduce emissions. Moreover, the participation by 
officials from companies outside of the electric power sector, which is relatively experienced 
with energy trading in many companies, will shed light on how different corporate cultures adapt 
to the new organizational issues posed by emissions trading programs (Kruger 2005).  
5.2 Flexible Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification 
The European Union’s emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification system is less 
prescriptive than systems used in U.S. trading programs (Kruger 2005). The guidelines spell out 
different “tiers” of methodologies with different degrees of assumed accuracy. Firms propose 
installation-specific methodologies to the relevant authority in each Member State. Installations 
are assumed to use the top tiers, but they may petition to use lower-tiered methods with lower 
assumed accuracy if they show that a methodology is impractical or cannot be achieved at 
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reasonable cost. Each member state has the autonomy to grant waivers from use of the top-tier 
methods (EC 2004b).  
Second, in contrast to the U.S. trading systems, Member State authorities may require 
companies to use private, third-party verifiers. Third-party verification may reduce government 
costs while providing valuable technical expertise to some Member State authorities. 
Nevertheless, the use of third-party verification for a cap-and-trade program raises several 
questions, including whether third-party verifiers will provide sufficient consistency in their 
interpretations of the monitoring guidelines.18  
5.2.1 Decentralized Approach 
The preceding discussion of monitoring and verification illustrates how some of the 
features that have been decided centrally within the federal U.S. SO2 trading program and the 
multi-jurisdictional U.S. NOx programs are decentralized within the EU system. While absolute 
standardization is not feasible or necessary, it is an open question whether the EU ETS model 
strikes the right balance between consistency and national sovereignty. For example, if firms in 
different Member States face significantly different compliance and enforcement regimes, will 
there be different gaming responses that undermine both the environmental credibility and the 
efficiency of the trading system? This may be a particularly critical question in Member States 
with historically weak environmental institutions, such as new EU members from former Soviet-
bloc countries or some Member States in Southern Europe.19  
Ultimately, questions of standardization in the design and operation of emissions trading 
systems are applicable beyond the EU. To the extent that future climate regimes link different 
domestic trading systems, similar issues are likely to arise. Thus, the balance between centralized 
and decentralized features in the EU system should be closely evaluated during the pilot phase of 
the program.  
                                                 
18 A more extensive discussion of these issues appears in Kruger and Pizer 2004 and Kruger 2005. 
19 For example, Blackman and Harrington (2000) have described some of the difficulties Poland has had with 
enforcing its emissions fee system. Tabara (2003) argues that Spain’s environmental administrative capacity has not 
always been adequate to face complex problems such as climate change. 
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5.3 Uncertainties within the EU ETS 
While the EU system blazes new territory in many areas and provides important 
experience, it also faces a number of challenges. Many of these challenges are byproducts of 
uncertainties and flaws in the Kyoto agreement. For example, banking between the first and 
second phases of the program is not mandatory, and Member States have generally restricted 
banking out of concern that use of banked allowances may make it more difficult to meet the 
target in the first Kyoto compliance period. The lack of banking may undermine longer-term 
mitigation plans because firms have little incentive to implement strategies that create extra 
emissions reductions beyond their allocated levels. The inability to bank these “early reductions” 
could be a significant disincentive if prices are low in the first period and high in the second.  
A more fundamental difficulty raised by the Kyoto process is uncertainty about the form 
and level of international commitment beyond 2012. This will constrain EU Member States in 
planning for the next phase of the EU ETS. It also makes it difficult for European industry to 
take a long-term approach to investing in climate-friendly technologies and to planning a least-
cost, longer-term strategy for GHG abatement. Moreover, although banking will be available 
between the second period and subsequent periods, uncertainty over the structure of a future 
international regime could make Member States and their industries reluctant to make the 
investment decisions that would enable them to take advantage of a banking provision.  
There is also uncertainty associated with EU ETS linkage to project-level offset 
provisions of the Kyoto agreement. As noted above, utilizing low-cost emission reductions in 
developing countries could be a critical component of cost-effective greenhouse gas trading 
program. In fact, analysis of EU ETS Member State National Allocation Plans shows that there 
will be considerable reliance on project-level offsets in many EU Member States (Zetterberg et 
al. 2004). Unfortunately, the provision for project-level offsets in developing countries, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), has been marked by problematic implementation and delays 
(Jepma 2005). It is not clear that the process to review and approve CDM projects will be 
capable of handling the necessary number of projects to meet worldwide demand for CDM 
credits (Kruger and Pizer 2004).  
6 Conclusions 
Few would have predicted the impact of the U.S. Acid Rain Program’s experiment on 
emissions trading. The SO2 trading model has influenced the development of the international 
16 Resources for the Future  Kruger 
emissions trading regime under the Kyoto Protocol, and emissions trading has become the 
primary policy instrument for addressing greenhouse gases. At the same time, the SO2 program 
has provided a useful benchmark as policy analysts have considered what different or additional 
features might be necessary for a greenhouse gas trading program. As discussed earlier, many of 
these features have now been incorporated into legislative and policy proposals. However, with 
little likelihood of quick federal action on greenhouse gas trading in the United States, the actors 
discussed in this paper are filling the vacuum by testing approaches and staking out positions that 
will likely have an important influence on future efforts on greenhouse gas trading.  
What are the implications of these initiatives for a future U.S. national program? First, 
these programs offer opportunities to experiment with some of the mechanisms that will be 
needed as we advance from the relatively simple SO2 trading model to a much more complex 
greenhouse gas model. For example, experiments with new offset and emissions reporting 
methodologies for non-CO2 gases under state and company initiatives could provide valuable 
insights. Similarly, exploration of new allowance distribution methodologies under the RGGI 
initiative offers the opportunity to improve understanding of the distributive issues associated 
with allowance distribution. Finally, experience with linking domestic programs in the European 
Union and with linking the EU ETS to project-level offsets under the CDM could be fruitful for 
exploring certain aspects of the architecture of future international agreements. 
The three initiatives discussed have been less trailblazing in addressing some of the other 
design features that are unique to greenhouse gas trading. For example, although the EU ETS 
covers a broader array of sectors, it still covers less than half of Europe’s CO2 emissions. In 
particular, it does not include emissions from the fast-growing transportation sector, and it is 
reportedly unlikely that new sectors will be added in the second phase of the program (Carbon 
Market Europe 2005). There has also been no experimentation with cost-limiting mechanisms 
such as the safety valve.20
Second, efforts to stake out potential design elements such as target types and allocation 
methodologies will likely grow as more companies begin to believe that a carbon constraint is 
inevitable. Whereas allowance allocation was a relatively new phenomenon when the Clean Air 
Act Amendments were passed in 1990, U.S. companies now have more understanding of the 
                                                 
20The one exception is Canada, which has proposed a safety-valve mechanism for its domestic emissions trading 
program. See Government of Canada 2002. 
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financial implications of these methodologies. The desire to influence future allowance 
allocations by establishing early reductions or signaling future allocation methodologies could 
build political support for an eventual mandatory program. On the other hand, the establishment 
of competing claims on allowances could also complicate the eventual development of such a 
program and could make it less likely that mechanisms such as auctions will be utilized.  
Third, some have argued that the proliferation of state approaches to registries or trading 
may hasten the advent of a national program by creating a “patchwork” of state programs that 
cries out for federal harmonization.21 However, with an issue as controversial as climate change 
policy, there is also a danger with this approach. Just as an early experiment with electricity 
restructuring in California may be one of the factors that has derailed momentum for national 
restructuring legislation (Joskow 2003), unsuccessful attempts by states on greenhouse gas 
trading could give ammunition to opponents of a national program. While experimentation at the 
state level is healthy and useful, these experiments must be successful to prove the concept for a 
national approach.  
Given its size and visibility, the perceived success or failure of the EU ETS is even more 
significant. The degree to which it succeeds or fails is likely to influence deeply any future 
international attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change that they cause. 
Moreover, if the EU trading program can demonstrate relatively low allowance prices and 
effective institutions for ensuring credible emission reductions, it will be more likely that the 
United States will adopt a program sooner rather than later. Conversely, if the EU program is 
viewed as excessively costly or ineffective, it will be a longer road from SO2 to greenhouse gas 
trading in the United States. 
                                                 
21 For a discussion of this political dynamic, see Swanson 2004 and Lee 2003.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Government and Private Programs for Emission Reduction and 
Reporting 
Chicago Climate Exchange: The Chicago climate exchange is a greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction and trading pilot program for emissions sources and offset projects in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. Projects also include Brazil. It is a self-regulatory, rules-based 
exchange designed and governed by the members. These members have made a voluntary, 
legally binding commitment to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases by 4% below the 
average of their 1998–2001 baselines by 2006. They include around 60 businesses and around 10 
other organizations.  
WWF Climate Savers: The NGO World Wide Fund of Nature (WWF) has built partnerships 
with individual leading corporations that pledge to reduce their global warming emissions 
considerably worldwide to 7% below 1990 levels by the year 2010. 
Environmental Defense Partnership for Climate Action: Under this program, companies 
partner with the NGO Environmental Defense and declare a GHG emissions target and the 
management actions, policies, and incentives necessary to achieve that goal. They measure, 
track, and publicly report net GHG emissions. 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Business Environmental Leadership Council: 
Under this partnership, companies “demonstrate leadership in addressing climate change by 
establishing and meeting emissions reduction objectives; investing in new, more efficient 
products, practices, and technologies; and supporting action to achieve cost-effective emissions 
reductions.” 
Climate Leaders: Under this government-sponsored program, companies develop 
comprehensive greenhouse gas inventories, set corporate emission reduction targets, and report 
annually their emissions and progress towards reaching their targets to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency.  
Climate VISION: The U.S. Climate VISION program encourages industry efforts to reduce, 
capture, or sequester greenhouse gases. Climate VISION links these objectives with technology 
development, commercialization, and commercial utilization activities supported by the private 
sector and the government. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Key Features of the EU ETS and U.S. Programs 
Features U.S.  SO2 Program  U.S. NOx Program  EU ETS 
Sectors Electric  Power 






Energy (including electric 
power, oil refineries, coke 
ovens) 
Metal ore, iron-and-steel 
production 
Minerals (including 
cement, lime, glass, 
ceramics) 
Pulp and paper 
Number of Regulated 
Sources 
3,000 units
a 2,400 12,000–13,000 
installations
b
Number of Political 
Jurisdictions 
1 (U.S. federal 
govt.) 
22 (21 states and the 
District of Columbia) 
25 member states 
Emissions Covered  SO2 NOx CO2, some or all of five 
other “Kyoto Gases” may 
be added later 
Project-Level Offsets?  No  No  Yes (proposed) 






a A “unit” is defined in U.S. trading programs as a combustion boiler. Thus, a power plant with five distinct boilers 
would be considered five units under the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs. 
b The classification of a regulated source of emissions is different in the EU ETS than it is in the U.S. programs. An 
installation could consist of multiple sources of emissions that have a technical connection with the activities carried 
out at a site. For example, a power plant would be considered one installation, even though there are multiple boilers. 
c Assumes an annual allocation of 8.9 million tons and an allowance price of $250/ton. (Note: SO2 allowance prices 
have recently increased dramatically from this level in anticipation of the significantly tighter cap that will be 
required under the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) to reduce fine particulate matter. See http://www.epa.gov/cair/ 
for information on CAIR. 
d Assumes an annual allocation of 500,000 tons and an allowance price of $2,400/ton. 
e Although the size of the EU ETS cap won’t be known until the National Allocation Plans for Phase II are final, 
Harrison and Radov (2002) cite an EU study that estimates an annual value of €30 billion ($37.5 billion) for 
allowances in the EU ETS.  
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